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Abstract. John Searle’s famous thought experiment known as 
the  „Chinese  Room  argument“  (CRA)  is  arguably  the  20th 
century’s greatest philosophical polarizer.  Countless arguments 
supportive and critical of  the CRA have been published in the 
last  few  decades.  Yet  what  is  missing  so  far,  is  an 
epistemological analysis on the role of the thought experiment in 
Searle’s argument, compared with the 17th century bête machine 
thought  experiment  of  René  Descartes.  This article  proposes 
such analysis, arguing that the CRA is not fit to support sound 
philosophical  debate  because  of  its  conflicting  nature  as  a 
deconstructive thought experiment.
INTRODUCTION
At the height of  the AI debate, in 1980, John Searle wrote a 
famous  essay  called  "Minds,  Brains  and Programs".  [1]  The 
essay features a well-known thought experiment, which is now 
commonly referred to as the „Chinese Room argument“ (CRA). 
Countless arguments supportive or critical of Searle’s argument 
have been published in the past few decades. Yet what is missing 
so  far,  is  an  epistemological  analysis  that  draws  historical 
parallels to Descartes bête machine thought experiment.  [2, 3] 
This historical parallel allows for a meta-analysis on the role of 
the thought experiment in Searle’s argument. Such analysis can 
direct future research questions in Cognitive Science.
After  briefly summarizing  the  Chinese  Room  argument  in 
part I, I will classify it in a three-level systematization of thought 
experiments (Part II). The classification will allow for drawing 
historical parallels to another famous thought experiment of  the 
same category, formulated by René Descartes (Part III). 
This  historical meta-analysis of  the  CRA will  lead to  the 
conclusion  that its chosen thought experiement  was bound  to 
fail. That will lead to three meta-guidelines that may guide future 
research within cognitive science. 
 
I. The Chinese Room
In “Minds, Brains and Programs” it is Searle’s aim to critize a 
position he calls “strong AI”. Strong AI claims that the computer 
is not merely a tool in the study of the mind, but rather, that the 
appropriately programmed computer which functions according 
to formal structures, really is a mind. 
Searle starts out by acknowledging that a computer is able to 
"think",  in the  sense that it is able  to process information by 
formal  syntactical  rules.  Yet,  the  computer c a n n o t  b e  
intentionally related  to  the objects and states of affairs in the 
world, even if these reflect the machine’s current mental states. 
After  discussing several other  thought  experiments,  Searle 
then introduces his own thought experiment: the „Chinese Room 
argument“.
Briefly summarized,  the  argument goes like  this: a  native 
English speaker is being locked into a room, after which he is 
given batches of  Chinese writing. The native speaker does not 
understand  Chinese  writing,  but  a  set  of  rules  in  his  own 
language  allows him  to identify the  Chinese symbols by their 
shape. Based on the formal rules he has been given, he is able to 
answer  written  questions  in  Chinese  in  a  way  that  is 
indistinguishable from a native Chinese speaker. 
As  a  result,  the  native  speaker  in  the  thought experiment 
passes the Turing Test. He is able to convince the native Chinese 
reader  with  his  sensible  answers,  yet  he  himself  does  not 
understand anything of the symbols he wrote. 
The morale of  the thought experiment is this: take the native 
speaker in the Chinese Room as a metaphor for a computer that 
performs  computational  operations  on  formally  specified 
elements. Then, it must become  apparent that, like  our  native 
speaker, a computer does not “understand” the symbols given to 
it.  The  set of  rules that it operates upon,  does not enable  the 
machine to understand them like a human being would. So, even 
if the computer would pass the Turing Test, there would not be 
any understanding by virtue of  running a program  of  the right 
sort.
If  Searle would have stopped here, his CRA would probably 
have entered the history of  the AI Debate as one of many other 
arguments.  Yet,  Searle  gave  his  readers  much  more  than  a 
thought experiment. He added something that we may now see 
as a skilfully written open invitation to the reader to think for 
him  or  herself.  He  continues  his  thought  experiment  with 
something  best  described  as  an  aloud  self-reflection  by  the 
author upon his previous thought experiment. What follows is an 
extensive set of possible answers, both critical and in favor of his 
own position. He takes the reader by the hand in a process of 
"Selbstdenken"  - thinking  for oneself.  However,  Searle's start 
into the process of  Selbstdenken was such,  that it triggered a 
polarizing intellectual debate. [4]
Unfortunately, this debate has generated more heat than light. 
Therefore, I refrain from any reflection upon the argument itself. 
Instead, I propose a meta-reflection on Searle's instruments for 
Selbstdenken: the thought experiment. The central question then 
becomes of  a meta-question: what type  of  thought experiment 
did Searle introduce in the CRA, and was this type suitable for 
demonstrating the question at stake?
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Early  in  the  1990s,  James  Robert  Brown  proposed  a 
taxonomy for thought experiments in the natural sciences.  [5]. 
The  taxonomy consists of  three  classes,  which  are  useful for 
analysing the nature of the CRA: 
1. deconstructive thought experiments -  show the logical 
contradictions  in premisses.  Typically,  the  destructive  thought 
experiment  is  some  sort  of  reductio  ad  absurdum  of  a  pre-
existing theory. Schrodinger's cat is for instance an example of a 
purely destructive thought experiment. It is meant to show that 
the  Copenhagen  interpretation  of  quantum  mechanics  is  in 
flagrant violation of well-entrenched common sense. The fate of 
the  cat's  life  in  the  sealed  box  depends  on  the  state  of  a 
subatomic particle. According to the Copenhagen interpretation, 
the cat would remain both alive and dead to the universe outside 
the box, until the  box  is opened.  So, this thought experiment 
illustrates  the  counterintuitiveness of  quantum  mechanics  and 
the mathematics necessary to describe quantum states.
2. constructive thought experiments - support a theory by 
pointing out their necessary,  yet not sufficient arguments.  An 
example  is  Maxwell's  thought  experiment  in  support  of  the 
second  law  of  thermodynamics.  The  aim  of  the  thought 
experiment is to demonstrate that it is possible that differences in 
temperature  in an isolated physical  system  equal  out  through 
heat passing from a cold body to a hot one - a thought held to be 
absurd  at  the  time.  In  the  thought  experiment  a  demon  is 
introduced,  which  controls  a  door  between  two  adjacent 
chambers,  one  hot,  the other  cold.  The  average  speed  of  the 
molecules is different in the two chambers; there are, however, 
some fast ones in the cold room. These the demon lets into the 
hot room  while letting slow molecules from  the hot room  into 
the cold. In this way heat has passed from  the cold to the hot 
chamber, since the average speed of the molecules has increased 
in the hot room and decreased in the cold. Therefore, it is indeed 
possible that heat can pass from a cold to a hot body.
3. platonic thought experiments - refute all theories but one. 
They  are  simultaneously  constructive  and  destructive.  They 
destroy  the  old  and  they  create  the  new  in  a  single  blow. 
Leibniz's argument for vis viva or  living force - a concept we 
would now call kinetic  energy  -  is  an  example.  His thought 
experiment simultaneously destroyed the Cartesian view of what 
is conserved and at the same time, established a new principle of 
conservation of energy.
At first sight, the CRA seems to be a classical deconstructive 
thought experiment. It takes the idea of the Turing Test, and then 
brings in the common sense notion of  what it means when a 
human  being  "understands a  language".  This  common  sense 
notion is then put in contrast with a human being passing the 
Turing  Test  based  on  computational  operations  on  formally 
specified  elements.  One  may  interpret  this  as  a  reductio  ad 
absurdum  of  the  strong  AI  notion,  that  an  appropriately 
programmed  computer,  which  functions  according  to  formal 
structures, really is a mind. Yet, there is more to it. 
Unlike Schrödinger’s purely destructive thought experiment 
of  the  cat  in  the  sealed  box,  the  CRA  is  not  exclusively 
deconstructive. The description of  the room  and the rule-based 
operations of  the  native speaker  are machine  analogies.  Such 
machine  analogies,  as  will  be  outlined  below,  are  always 
constructive,  not deconstructive.  To make  this point,  we  will 
briefly draw a parallel to René Descartes’ idea of a bête machine. 
III. 17th century parallel: The Bête Machine
Descartes’ thought experiment commonly known as the "bête 
machine"  is one of  the most famous ideas of  machines of  the 
17th century. Like all thought experiments, it starts with a typical 
‘if’, in the sense of ‘suppose’, ‘assume’, ‘imagine. What follows 
is a  hypothetical machine  setting that  gives a  fair  amount of 
technological details. These details are important, as they guide 
what  instinctive  knowledge,  or  common  sense,  is  bound  to 
‘know’ intuitively from experience about the issues at stake.
The central idea of  the "bête machine"  will be summarized 
here without all mechanical details and also without an analysis 
of  the  set  of  “common knowledge”  that  these  details  would 
relate to for the 17th century reader. 
“If  there were such machines...” part V of  the Discourse on 
Method states, “...having the organs and the shape of  a monkey 
or of  some other animal that lacked reason, we would have no 
way of recognizing that they were not entirely of the same nature 
as these animals.” [8]
This is the core of  the bête machine thought experiment. It 
gives constructive evidence for one theory, namely that animals 
are  complex  clockworks.  The  central  notion  is  that  if  one 
assumes that technology will advance in such a way that more 
parts and more complex mechanisms will be available over time, 
then that will lead to more delicate behavior, and in the end, that 
development will lead to such scale of  complexity, that it will 
match the external behavior of a monkey. 
There  are  three  underlying  assumptions  here.  One: 
technology  will  advance  continually  in  the  sense  of  the 
advancement  of  the  Baconian  Sciences.  The  mechanical 
clockwork represents the  idea  of  "state-of-the-art technology": 
the  most  advanced  technology  of  the  time.  Two:  there  is  a 
positive  correlation  between  technological  advancement  and 
external behavior. That means, in ten, twenty or fifty years, the 
technological  proficiency  will  be  such  that  indeed,  a  bête 
machine  will be  able  to  simulate  the  external behavior  of  a 
monkey.  Three:  there  is  no  fundamental  difference  between 
biological and mechanical matter. This is a typical thought for 
early  modern philosophy: the natural world can be  seen as  a 
gigantic  mechanical clockwork whose laws of  motion can be 
known with mathematical precision. Thus, the only distinction 
between a machine and a monkey is a graduate one in terms of 
functional complexity. 
This  is  a  perfect  example  of  a  machine-based  thought 
experiment.  It  shows  very  well  why  these  types  of  thought 
experiments must be constructive. The   mechanical clockwork 
serves  as  a  "hook"  for  common  sense  notions  of  matter, 
perception,  behavior,  complexity  and  technology.  These  are 
constructive intuitive connotations, and they all contribute to the 
constructive, intuitive evidence for an existing theory. It works 
through  double negation: the imagined possibility of  the  bête 
machine is an argument for the exclusion of its impossibility. 
If Descartes would have tried to prove that the bête machine 
would not be possible, his thought experiment would prove per 
definition that not the idea itself, but the technological setting of 
the  thought experiment would have  been wrong.  The thought 
experiment in which the bête machine  does not live up to the 
complex  behavior  of  a  monkey,  is  simply  a  bad  thought 
experiment,  because,  for  instance,  the  proposed machinery  is 
outdated,  too  simplistic  or  naive.  A  deconstructive  machine-
based thought experiment would prove only one thing: that the 
chosen technological analogy is not complex  enough. It would not prove that the presuppositions of its underlying theory - the 
mechanical  philosophy  -  in  itself  were  contradictory  or 
erroneous.
After Descartes presented his theory of bête machine and the 
according thought experiments, the issue was widely discussed 
in philosophical circles of the time, such as those of Arnauld and 
Mersenne  [5].  Descartes himself  entered a  heated debate  with 
Libert Froidmond, who questioned — next to various religious 
matters —  dozens of  mechanical details in Descartes’ thought 
experiments.  Froidmond’s  basic intuition seems  to have  been 
that the Cartesian invisible gearwheels of nature, of  which only 
size,  position  and  movement  count,  would  not  be  complex 
enough to explain for all animal behavior. Similar  doubts had 
Alphonse  Pollot,  another  one  of  Descartes’  philosophical 
correspondents,  who wondered whether animal affections  and 
passions  could  accurately  be  explained  with  the  mechanism 
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Descartes  answered  by  presenting  yet  another  thought 
experiment. More vivid and detailed than the first one, and more 
compelling. Imagine, he answered Pollot, a man who never saw 
any other living beings than other humans in his life. This man 
would be asked to build mechanical animals and creatures with a 
human-like  figure.  Then  he  would  have  two  ways  of 
distinguishing human-like automatons from  real humans: first, 
mechanical man would move much more perfectly and regularly 
than  biological  man.  Indeed,  Descartes  was  convinced  that 
machines  were  far  superior  in  making  elegant  and  precise 
movements than humans. Second, mechanical man would not be 
able  to  answer  sensibly  to  arbitrary  questions,  as  would 
biological  man.  These are,  as  Descartes argues,  our  two  sure 
criteria to distinguish machine from man. However, that ignorant 
observant  would  have  no  way  to  distinguish  machine  from 
animal. Both, mechanism and animal flesh would fly away when 
disturbed, yelp when kicked, flee when seeing a stick with which 
it had been beaten,  and bark at own will,  while  ignoring  all 
human questions.
The seventeenth century saw many such mechanical thought 
experiments,  yet  not  even  one  was  deconstructive.  On  the 
contrary,  mechanical  philosophers were  so confident in  their 
ability to think up a rational and mechanical explanation for all 
seemingly  inexplicable  or  occult  phenomena,  that  they  were 
even encouraged to find mechanical explanations for phenomena 
that could not be directly explained with isomorphic structures 
known  from  the  most advanced  technology  of  the  time.  For 
instance,  the  historian  of  science  can  easily  find  multiple 
mechanical  explanations  for  such  phenomena  as  why  Saturn 
sends  his  dark  moods  to  earthling  man  through  invisible 
mechanical reduction gearings.
The deconstructive part in the CRA
Back to the Chinese Room  argument.  Searle seems to have 
tried to introduce a machine-based thought experiment for  the 
purpose of deconstructing a theory. And that is, as the examples 
from  the 17th century have demonstrated, an undertaking bound 
to fail.
The  key  issue  is,  that  if  the  CRA  will  point  out  any 
contradiction  in  theory,  then  these  contradictions  can  per 
definition  be  explained  away  by  challenging  the  analogous 
relationship between "machine" or “set of rules” (in this case, the 
Chinese Room as an analogy for a computer) and "theory". And 
this  is  exactly  what  happened  in  the  CRA-reception:  many 
authors  have  shown that the  Chinese  Room  would be  a  too 
simplistic setting, or, as Margaret Boden has done, to show that 
interpreting  formal  rules  should  also  be  understood  as 
‘understanding’ [7]. It has been argued that the details for  the 
computational operations have been too simplistic. So the issue 
is here,  that  any deconstructive  thought can be  addressed  to 
issues related to the details of the "Chinese Room machinery", or 
to definitions of   concepts used in the thought experiment. They 
do not touch the underlying theory. 
So, if Searle wants to demonstrate that strong AI is not a good 
model, or does not explain the functionality of the human mind, 
or takes a too narrow sense of ‘understanding’ for granted, then 
that is due to limitations in the setting of the Chinese Room  and 
is common sense notions.
In order to be convincing to his critics, Searle then continued 
on a path Descartes already took in the 17th century. He added 
increasingly more details to his thought experiment. And every 
new detail would refer to new common sense notions of  human 
reasoning or notions of what it means to be an intelligent agent. 
For example: with every detail added to the thought experiment 
more  background  notions  of  what  it  means  to  "understand" 
language, or how formal rules may lead to intelligent behavior, 
are added to the setting.
This  results  in  two  major  epistemological  flaws  in  the 
Chinese Room.  First: it becomes circular reasoning. That what 
needs to be proven (what it means to "understand" something) 
becomes part of the Chinese Room  and its associated common 
sense notions of it. Second: whatever details are added or deleted 
from the initial CRA, it will always leave the idea untouched that 
the appropriately programmed computer really is a mind.
Thus, instead of  reflecting the logic contradictions of strong 
AI, Searle’s thought experiment circles around its own analogies 
and their explanatory status. 
There is, as the 17th century example has shown, only one 
possible  outcome  of  deconstructive  machine-related  thought 
experiments. One thought experiment will be followed by a next, 
more detailed one, which is followed by another one, and so on 
and so forth, ad infinitum. [9] And this is indeed pretty much 
what happened in the few decades that followed Searle’s essay.
Outlook
For  future  research in  the  field  of  Cognitive  Science,  the 
previous  analysis of  the CRA seems to suggest the  following 
meta-guidelines. 
1. Any theory of  human or machine intelligence should, as a 
minimum  requirement  be  self-aware  of  the  thought 
experiments  introduced  and  their  role  as  constructive 
heuristic  aids.    Their  role  in  theory  making  and  their 
reference  to our implicit  set of  “background knowledge” 
and  ‘pre-established’  analogies  should  be  stated  as 
explicitly  as  possible.  Special  care  should  be  taken  in 
2 A detailed account on the debate in [9] pp. 198-205.pointing out the scope and overall significance of common 
sense notions within the overall argument. 
2.  With thought experiments that feature machine settings, it 
should be stated explicitly that the outcome must always be 
constructive,  and therefore will  have  limited explanatory 
use.
3. Deconstructive  machine-related  thought  experiments  are 
from  an  epistemological  point  of  view,  circular  and 
irrelevant  to  theory.  They  are  of  little  use  in  terms  of 
guiding future research. 
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